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GAMBLER FINDS BETTER ODDS AGAINST THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
GROETZINGER IRS
UNITED STATES TAX COURT Won Lost
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Won Lost
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT Won Lost
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service v. Groetzinger'
("Groetzinger"), the United States Supreme Court held that a taxpayer
pursuing his livelihood by gambling on a full-time basis is engaged in a
trade or business and therefore is not subject to minimum tax.2 After
twenty years of service, Robert Groetzinger's employer, Gerstenslager
Company, an Illinois manufacturer, terminated him from his sales and
market research position in February 1978. For the remainder of the
year, Groetzinger went to the track in Florida or Colorado on an average
of six days each week, wagering mostly on greyhound races. He spent
sixty to eighty hours each week studying racing forms, programs and
other related materials for gambling. Based on Groetzinger's detailed
daily records, his gross winnings were $70,000 and his losses were
$72,032, for a net gambling loss of $2,032 in 1978. 3 Groetzinger gambled
only for his own account. He never placed bets on behalf of another, sold
betting tips or received commissions. He gambled to earn a living and
had no other employment during this period.'
On his 1978 federal tax return, Groetzinger did not report any gam-
bling winnings or deduct his net gambling losses.' He reported only his
income from non-gambling sources in the amount of $6,498, which he
received as interest, dividends, capital gains and wages prior to his termi-
1. -.U.S.-., 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987). Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion in which
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Justice White, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, filed the dissenting opinion.
2. Section 56 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 explains the various circumstances
under which additional tax may be due based on the applicability of minimum tax. The mini-
mum tax was enacted to increase the tax burden of individuals receiving extensive tax benefits
through the use of certain tax deductions. These deductions are identified as preference items.
These preference items are generally added back to the taxpayer's income to determine the
minimum tax. Gambling losses were considered a preference item for tax years prior to 1983,
before the Tax Equity and Responsibility Act took effect. I.R.C. § 56 (1954).
3. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 982.
4. Id.
5. Id. Groetzinger reported gambling losses of $2,032 as his supplemental income, but
did not use any of these losses to reduce his total income. Id.
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nation. Based on the audit conducted by the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"), the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service ("Commis-
sioner") determined that Groetzinger's gambling losses did not com-
pletely offset his tax liability created by the winnings. Although section
165(d) of the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") 6 allowed a deduction
for gambling losses to the extent of gambling winnings, the gambling
losses not connected to a trade or business gave rise to a minimum tax.7
The Code provision in effect between 1976 and 1983 treated gambling
winnings as a preference item,' since gambling losses were allowed to
6. I.R.C. § 165(d) (1986). Section 165(d) provides that "[lI]osses from wagering transac-
tions shall be allowed only to the extent of gains from such transactions." Any gambling losses
in excess of winnings are not deductible. Id. Generally, gambling losses are treated as miscel-
laneous itemized deductions. Id. § 63(h) (1986). Therefore, gambling losses may not com-
pletely offset an equal amount of gambling winnings unless the taxpayer is entitled to other
itemized deductions in excess of the standard deduction. A taxpayer will generally use the
standard deduction to offset the adjusted gross income unless an election is made to use the
itemized deductions to reduce the adjusted gross income. There is no benefit to itemizing
deductions unless they exceed the standard deduction.
If gambling losses were the only itemized deductions, the actual benefit from gambling
losses to reduce the adjusted gross income would be the excess of gambling losses over the
standard deduction provided that gambling losses do not exceed gambling winnings. For ex-
ample, if a single taxpayer in 1987, with a standard deduction of $2,540, wins $70,000 and
loses $70,000 from gambling activities, only $67,460 ($70,000 minus $2,540) of benefit is de-
rived from the gambling losses to offset his gambling income provided that the taxpayer is not
entitled to other itemized deductions. This result occurs because the standard deduction is lost
when a taxpayer elects to itemize.
If the taxpayer does not have enough gambling losses or other itemized deductions in
excess of the standard deduction, no benefit is derived from using the gambling losses to offset
gambling winnings. For example, if a single taxpayer in 1987, with a standard deduction of
$2,540, wins $70,000 but only loses $2,000 in gambling, the taxpayer does not benefit from the
gambling losses since taking the standard deduction of $2,540 will be more advantageous than
deducting $2,000 in gambling losses.
7. I.R.C. § 56(a) (1976). Even though gambling losses may eliminate the gambling gains,
gambling losses are added back to calculate the minimum tax to the extent the losses are not
connected to a trade or business. Id. See supra note 2.
8. I.R.C. § 57 (1976). Preference items are added back to the taxpayer's income to calcu-
late the minimun tax. Id. See supra note 2. The notion of preference items developed as
taxpayers were greatly reducing their taxes through the use of allowable deductions. These
deductions, or portions of them, required to be added back to income to calculate minimum
tax are called preference items.
The policy rationale for designating gambling losses as a preference item most likely re-
sulted from the legislature's belief that it was inequitable for gambling losses to reduce taxpay-
ers' tax liabilities. For some, gambling has a negative moral stigma which creates strong
disincentives against promoting it through favorable tax treatment. Also, the legislators were
probably reluctant to allow a full deduction for gambling expenses because they are usually a
form of personal consumption. While investment losses are deductible in certain instances,
personal expenses for leisure are not deductible.
Because gambling may take the form of either leisure or investment, the legislature made
a concession and allowed gambling losses to be deductible but only to the extent of gambling
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offset gambling winnings only if they were "attributable to a trade or
business" 9 for the calculation of the minimum tax. Groetzinger took the
position that his gambling activities constituted a trade or business and
were therefore not subject to the minimum tax.
The Commissioner determined that Groetzinger was subject to a
minimum tax of $2,142 along with other adjustments for a total tax defi-
ciency of $2,522 for 1978.10 The United States Tax Court held that
Groetzinger was in the trade or business of gambling and therefore the
gambling winnings were not a preference item for the computation of
minimum tax." After the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's rul-
ing,' 2 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
current state of conflict among the courts of appeal, and affirmed.
The facts of the present case were undisputed. The sole issue for the
Supreme Court was to ascertain the meaning of "trade or business"
under the Code sections applicable to the minimum tax. The Court be-
gan its analysis by noting that the phrase "trade or business" is used in
more than 50 sections and 800 subsections of the Code, but the Code
contains no definition of these words.13 In addition, no regulation has
been issued for its general application. 4
The Court reviewed numerous cases dealing with this issue and con-
cluded that no completely satisfactory definition had yet been developed.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, began by looking to the early
case of Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 5 in which the Court had discussed a
very broad definition of the word "business" as "that which occupies
time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of livelihood or
profit."' 6 The majority also gave some weight to the idea that Congress
uses words and phrases in their popular meanings because statutes are
more practical if words stand for their commonly understood meaning. 7
gains. However, since gambling can also be a leisure activity, the legislature designated gam-
bling losses as a preference item to prevent excessive tax deductions.
9. I.R.C. §§ 57(a)(1), 57(b)(1)(a), 62(1) (1976).
10. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980, 982 (1987).
11. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 82 T.C. 793 (1984). The Tax Court followed its earlier
decision in Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362 (1983), and held that full-time gambling
may be a trade or business. Ditunno overruled an earlier Tax Court decision in Gentile v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1 (1975), which denied the Internal Revenue Service the ability to
assess self-employment taxes against a full-time gambler, holding that the gambler was not
engaged in a trade or business. Id.
12. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985).
13. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 983 (1987).
14. Id.
15. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
16. Id. at 171.
17. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 984 (1987).
19881
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The Court then distinguished an active securities trader engaged in a
recognized trade from an investor trading only for his own account to
determine whether a full-time gambler is involved in a trade or busi-
ness.'8 In Snyder v. Commissioner,9 which dealt with margin trading
and capital gains, the Court held that an investor merely trading to in-
crease his own holdings was not engaged in a trade or business unless a
major portion of the taxpayer's time was devoted to transacting for the
purpose of earning a living.2"
The Court in Groetzinger also considered Deputy v. Du Pont,21 a case
dealing with the same issue, where the Court assumed that the taxpayer
was engaged in a trade or business in determining whether carrying
charges on short sales of stock were deductible business expenses. 22 Jus-
tice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, left the question of whether
the taxpayer was engaged in a trade or business open for determination.
He did, however, take the position that section 23(a) required the selling
of goods or services to constitute a trade or business.23
The Court in Groetzinger also reviewed Higgins v. Commissioner,24
("Higgins"), where the Court unanimously held that salaries and other
expenses incurred to manage one's own investments are not deductible as
business expenses pursuant to section 23(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932.25
The Court in Higgins disallowed deductions for such expenses because
the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business, but was merely in-
creasing the value of his personal investments. Within three months of
the Higgins case, the Court in City Bank Farmers Trust v. Helvering
2 6
and in United States v. Pyne 27 held that estate and trust fees were also
not deductible as business expenses based on the Higgins case.
The Court then discussed Snow v. Commissioner,28 which addressed
the definition of a trade or business in the context of partnerships, to
determine whether the ruling in Snow applied to non-partnership activi-
ties such as gambling. In Snow, the Court allowed a taxpayer-partner to
18. Id.
19. 295 U.S. 134 (1935).
20. Id.
21. 308 U.S. 48 (1940).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
24. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
25. Id. Ordinary and necessary expenses are allowed as deductions only if they are in-
curred or paid in carrying on any trade or business. Id. I.R.C. § 23(a) (1932) (recodified as
I.R.C. § 162(a) (1986)).
26. 313 U.S. 121 (1941).
27. 313 U.S. 127 (1941).
28. 416 U.S. 500 (1974).
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deduct a pro rata share of the partnership loss pursuant to section
174(a)(1) of the 1954 Code.29 The taxpayer had invested capital in the
partnership for the development of an invention and was permitted to
deduct appropriate expenses related to the activity. The Court stated
that the business requirement under section 16230 is more narrowly writ-
ten than in section 174,3" which explained why the taxpayer in Snow was
entitled to business deductions without satisfying the selling of goods or
services requirement mentioned in the Du Pont case by Justice
Frankfurter.
3 2
Although the Court in Groetzinger noted that there is little case law
or statutory guidance for defining trade or business, the Court made the
following observations regarding the term based on the cases discussed
above: (1) The concept of trade or business is broad and comprehensive;
(2) expenses incurred in maintaining the taxpayer's estate are not deduct-
ible as business expenses regardless of the full-time involvement of the
taxpayer; (3) an opposite result may be reached for a full-time trader;
(4) the requirement of a business to sell goods or services discussed by
Justice Frankfurter in Du Pont was not adopted by the Court; and (5) the
Court recognized that the definition of business is vague and used the
term "adumbration" to describe it.
33
The Court in Groetzinger formally rejected Justice Frankfurter's re-
quirement of offering goods or services in order for an activity to consti-
tute a trade or business. 34 Groetzinger's argument that he was selling
goods or services not only to himself, but also to the gambling market
convinced the Court that Justice Frankfurter's test was not stringent
enough. The Court reasoned that a test that anyone can pass is useless.35
In order to resolve the issue without any authoritative guidance, the
Court focused on a common sense concept of trade or business. It rea-
soned that taxing Groetzinger for his gambling losses was distinctly in-
consistent with the Code. The more he lost, the more minimum tax he
would have been required to pay. Based on this reasoning, the Court
29. Id.
30. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1986). Section 162(a) provides in relevant part: "There shall be al-
lowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .. " Id.
31. I.R.C. § 174(a)(1) (1954). Section 174(a)(1) provides in relevant part: "A taxpayer
may treat research or experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred by him during the
taxable year in connection with his trade or business as expenditures which are not chargeable
to capital account." Id.
32. Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503 (1974).
33. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service v. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980, 986 (1987).
34. Id. at 987.
35. Id.
19881
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held that Groetzinger was engaged in a trade or business, stating that
gambling is to be considered a trade or business if such activities are
pursued in good faith with regularity on a full-time basis for the purpose
of earning a living.36 The fact that Groetzinger was not successful in his
activities was not controlling. The Court explicitly stated that it was not
overruling the holding in Higgins ," since Higgins required an independ-
ent examination based on specific facts.3" In Groetzinger, the Court
adopted the test developed in Higgins and applied the test to determine
whether gambling activities constituted a trade or business based on the
specific facts of the case.
The dissenting Justices, however, argued that the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, by explicitly excluding gambling losses
from the minimum tax base which is calculated from the adjusted gross
income, made clear that gambling is not a trade or business.39 The dis-
sent reasoned that the exclusion of gambling losses from the minimum
tax base will in effect allow a double deduction for business gambling
losses, because business losses in general are deducted prior to calculat-
ing the adjusted gross income. Since gambling is recognized as a trade or
business, gambling losses would be used to offset any winnings to deter-
36. Id. at 988.
37. Id.
38. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 215 (1941).
39. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 988 (White J., dissenting). In computing the alternative
minimum tax, certain itemized deductions are deducted from the adjusted gross income.
These deductions are known as alternative minimum itemized deductions. These deductions
consist of: (1) gambling losses; (2) charitable contributions; (3) medical expenses in excess of
10 percent of adjusted gross income; (4) certain estate tax deductions; (5) qualified housing
interest; (6) portion of casualty losses and (7) other interest to the extent of net investment
income already included to compute the alternative minimum tax. I.R.C. § 55 (1982).
After the adjusted gross income is reduced by the alternative minimum itemized deduc-
tions, preference items are added back to determine the alternative minimum taxable income
from which certain exemptions are deducted to calculate the alternative minimum tax. Prefer-
ence items include: (1) accelerated depreciation on real property in excess of straight-line
depreciation; (2) bargain element of certain exercised stock options; (3) excess depletion deduc-
tion in excess of the adjusted basis of the property; (4) amortization of certified pollution con-
trol and child care facilities in excess of depreciation normally allowed; (5) depreciation of
leased personalty in excess of straight-line depreciation; (6) dividends excluded and (7) tax free
"All-Savers" interest. Note that gambling losses are no longer a preference item. Id. § 57.
If professional gambling losses are deductible from professional gambling winnings to
calculate the adjusted gross income, a taxpayer subject to the alternative minimum tax can
then deduct gambling losses once again as an alternative minimum itemized deduction to cal-
culate the minimum tax. Since gambling losses are deductible as an alternative minimum
itemized deduction, the dissent argued that it must not have been the intent of Code sections
55 and 57 to allow gambling losses as a trade or business expense prior to deducting the same
expenses as an alternative minimum itemized deduction, since that would constitute a double
deduction. This is the result the dissent in Groetzinger wanted to prevent. Groetzinger, 107 S.
Ct. at 988 (White J., dissenting).
[Vol. 8
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mine profits in order to compute the adjusted gross income, just as any
other business does. Then, gambling losses would be deducted again
from the adjusted gross income to calculate the minimum tax base to
determine the alternative minimum tax. Thus, the dissent concluded
that Congress could not have intended gambling to be considered a trade
or business since the result would be a double deduction for gambling
losses.
The dissent recognized that arguments could be made that gambling
was a trade or business prior to the 1982 changes. However, the dissent
insisted that the Court should not alter the meaning of trade or business
with reference to the pre-1982 years merely to avoid a harsh result in this
case.
40
The dissent's concerns regarding the advantage a taxpayer may get
by deducting the gambling losses twice are no longer applicable for tax
years beginning with 1987, after the passage of the Tax Reform Act of
1986. Under the new law, the alternative minimum tax calculation does
not require an adjustment for gambling losses.41 Gambling losses are
deducted only once when calculating taxable income. Therefore, for tax
years beginning with 1987, the alternative minimum tax will not be af-
fected by the designation of gambling activities as a trade or business.
However, after Groetzinger, it is still possible that this issue may
arise in the area of self-employment taxes levied on gambling profits.42
In Gentile v. Commissioner,43 the tax court rejected the position of the
IRS that a professional gambler was subject to self-employment taxes
because the taxpayer did not hold himself out as a provider of any goods
or services. That tax court decision was overruled in Ditunno v. Commis-
40. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 988 (White J., dissenting).
41. I.R.C. §§ 56(b)(1)(A)(i), 67(b) (1986). The alternative minimum tax is more broadly
based after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The new law increased the number of preference
items and limited the use of certain itemized deductions in order to increase the difficulty of
excessively reducing the tax liability through the use of tax deductions. Id. § 56(b). However,
gambling losses are not included in the calculation of the revised alternative minimum tax. Id.
§§ 56(b)(1)(A)(i), 67(b)(3). Under the revised code, miscellaneous itemized deductions are
generally added back to taxable income to calculate the alternative minimum tax. Id.
§ 56(b)(l)(A)(i). Gambling losses are specifically excluded as a miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tion and are not required to be added back to taxable income to calculate the alternative mini-
mum tax. Id. § 67(b)(3). The revised code prevents gambling losses from being deducted
twice in calculating the alternative minimum tax. Professional gambling losses would be de-
ducted from gross income and recreational gambling losses would be deducted as itemized
deductions without any adjustment to gambling losses to compute the revised alternative
minumum tax.
42. I.R.C. § 1401 (1986).
43. Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1 (1975).
1988]
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sioner4 when the court rejected the requirement of offering goods or
services to qualify as a trade or business.
Self-employment taxes are assessed on profits generated by an indi-
vidual engaged in a trade or business.4" A gambler engaged in a trade or
business will be subject to self-employment taxes when gambling win-
nings exceed ordinary and necessary gambling costs, including gambling
losses; in other words, when he makes a profit. In the present case for
example, although the Court concluded that Groetzinger was in the busi-
ness of gambling, he would not have been subject to any self-employment
taxes since he did not generate any gambling profits in 1978.
Even though the IRS failed in its attempt to assess Groetzinger with
the minimum tax, the Court, by recognizing that gambling activities can
be considered a trade or business, increased the revenue raising potential
of the IRS. By rejecting the position of the IRS with regards to the mini-
mum tax, the Court prevented the IRS from assessing the minimum tax
but instead subjected professional gamblers to self-employment taxes.
Thus, the Court's holding indirectly favored the IRS. With the possibil-
ity of being subject to self-employment taxes by engaging in gambling as
a trade or business, successful gamblers in the future will try to avoid
qualifying as professional gamblers under the test set forth in Groetz-
inger. The IRS, contrary to its position taken in Groetzinger, will now be
on the look-out for professional gamblers.
The Court's holding in Groetzinger left one important issue un-
resolved, the applicability of Code section 165(d)46 to professional gam-
blers. Since not all businesses are profitable, especially during the start-
up years, the IRS has traditionally allowed business losses to reduce in-
come from non-business sources to help reduce the overall tax burden.4 7
This rule prevents taxpayers from having to pay taxes when business
losses exceed non-business income. Otherwise, taxpayers would be sub-
ject to taxes while operating unprofitably.
However, under Code section 165(d), gambling losses can only be
used to offset income to the amount of gambling winnings.48 The issue,
then, is whether the section's limitation is consistent with the fact that
gambling may constitute a trade or business.
The holding in the present case did not indicate whether gambling
losses in excess of gambling winnings are deductible. The Court did not
44. Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362 (1983).
45. I.R.C. § 1402(a) (1986).
46. Id. § 165(d). See supra note 6 for text of section 165(d).
47. Id. § 62(a)(1).
48. Id. § 165(d).
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have to resolve the issue in the present case since Groetzinger, although
he lost more than he won, did not deduct any gambling losses in excess of
his winnings.
There is a strong indication that the limitation of gambling losses to
the extent of gambling winnings under section 165(d) was not intended to
apply to "business" activities. The fact that "non-business" gambling
losses incurred by a taxpayer not engaged in the business of gambling are
only deductible from adjustable gross income as itemized deductions,49
indicates that this section was intended to apply only to non-business,
recreational gambling losses. The statute was probably enacted to limit
the use of recreational gambling losses because there is an element of
personal consumption associated with gambling activities engaged in by
the majority of the population.
Other allowable itemized deductions which are personal in nature
will support the proposition that itemized deductions were intended for
personal, non-business expenditures. These itemized deductions include
medical and dental expenses,50 state and local income taxes, 5' real estate
taxes,52 home mortgage interest53 and casualty losses.5 4 Business losses,
on the other hand, are deducted directly from gross income. 55 This pro-
cedural difference strongly indicates that section 165(d), limiting gam-
bling losses, was intended to apply only to recreational gambling losses.
In conclusion, the court in Groetzinger held that gambling can con-
stitute a trade or business based on the factual circumstances of the tax-
payer. The case dealt specifically with the applicability of the minimum
tax based on the determination of whether the taxpayer's gambling activ-
ities were extensive enough to be considered a trade or business. This
narrow holding in relation to the minimum tax is no longer applicable
after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 took effect.
However, the possibility that gambling activity can be extensive
enough to constitute a trade or business may now give rise to self-em-
ployment taxes for professional gamblers. Professional gamblers, like
other self-employed taxpayers conducting a trade or business, will be
subject to self-employment taxes on their profits. But by qualifying as a
trade or business, professional gamblers, like other self-employed taxpay-
ers, should be allowed to deduct their business losses from non-business
49. Id. § 63(d).
50. I.R.C. § 213 (1986).
51. Id. § 164(a)(3).
52. Id. § 164 (a)(1).
53. Id. §§ 163(a), 163(h)(2)(D).
54. Id. § 165(h).
55. Id. § 62(a)(1).
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income. Thus, a professional gambler, such as Groetzinger, who lost
more than he won, will not be subject to any self-employment taxes and
should be able to deduct his net professional gambling losses from other
income such as wages, investment interest, and dividends.
Alexander R. Jampel
